

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4737

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 CAIRO 6195

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR EG US IS

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

REF: CAIRO 6191

1. INTRODUCTION: WITH FAHMY'S HELP, I WAS ABLE TO ARRANGE WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE AN HOUR LONG MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT TODAY AT BORG AL-ARAB. FAHMY AND I DROVE UP TOGETHER. IN THE COURSE OF THE THREE AND A HALF HOUR TRIP, I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT VP MOBAREK WOULD BE THERE. IF SO, I WONDERED WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION WOULD BE IF I ASKED TO DISCUSS ONE OR TWO MATTERS ALONE WITH HIM OR WITH ONLY FAHMY PRESENT. FAHMY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER MOBAREK WOULD BE THERE, BUT STRONGLY ADVISED AGAINST ANY SUCH PROPOSAL. IT WOULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD AT ONCE MAKE MOBAREK SUSPICIOUS. ALL OF US MUST RECOGNIZE, FAHMY RUEFULLY OBSERVED, THAT MOBAREK IS FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST LIKELY TO BE A REGULAR PARTICIPANT IN ALL SENSITIVE MEETINGS. THE PRESIDENT WANTS IT THAT WAY. AS IT TRANSPIRED, MOBAREK WAS ON HAND. SADAT HAD EARLIER IN THE DAY RECEIVED VISITING SYRIAN PRIMIN AYYUBI AND IRAQI FONMIN. MOBAREK HAD APPARENTLY BEEN PRESENT AT BOTH OF THESE MEETINGS.

2. SADAT RECEIVED ME CORDIALLY, BUT WAS OBVIOUSLY

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EXPENTANT. FROM HIS DEMEANOR RATHER THAN FROM ANYTHING

HE SAID, I HAD THE IMPRESSION HE WAS RATHER EXPECTING UNWELCOME NEWS. AFTER CONVEYING PRESIDENT FORD'S AND YOUR GREETINGS, I PRESENTED THE ISREALI PROPOSAL.

3. ISRAELI PROPOSAL: I RECALLED TO THE PRESIDENT THE SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH RABIN IN WASHINGTON AND YOUR SUBSEQUENT SESSION WITH THE ISRAELI PRIMIN IN NEW YORK. IN THE COURSE OF THESE PROTRACTED AND INTENSIVE TALKS, THE ISRAELIS HAD PRESENTED US WITH A MAP SETTING FORTH THEIR PROPOSAL. I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY THEIR PROPOSAL TO HIM WITHOUT COMMENT OR RECOMMENDATION. I THEN SHOWED HIM THE ISRAELI MAP AND EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO HIM.

4. IN POINTING OUT THE NEWLY-PROPOSED ISRAELI FORWARD DEFENSE LINE, I NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SAY IT IS FARTHER EAST THAN THEIR LINE OF LAST MARCH. MOREOVER, THEY ENVISAGE THE EGYPTIANS ABSORBING THE PRESENT UN ZONE. SADAT STUDIED THE LINE CAREFULLY BUT EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT. THE ISRAELI LINE HE SAID, SEEMED TO HIM TO BE ROUGHLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PASSES. IF SO THIS WAS NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THEIR PAST POSITION. I THEN SHOWED HIM THE SECOND ISRAELI MAP DEPICTING THE ISRAELI VERSION OF THEIR MARCH LINE. IN DOING SO, I NOTED THAT YOU HAD NEVER BEEN GIVEN ANY SUCH MAP AT THE TIME, BUT THAT THE ISRAELIS ASSERT THAT THEIR NEW LINE IS TO THE EAST OF THE LINE SHOWN ON THEIR MARCH MAP. FAHMY HAD A COPY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES MAP ATTRIBUTED TO THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, WHICH AS REPORDUCED SEEMED ROUGHTLY TO BISECT THE TWO PASSES. HE SHOWED THIS TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO CONTINUED TO BE PUZZLED. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE FORWARD ISRAELI POSITIONS, AS WE UNDERSTAND RABIN'S PROPOSAL, WOULD BE JUST WEST OF AND BELOW THE HIGHEST POINTS IN THE PASSES. THESE HIGH POINTS, THE ISRAELIS INSIST, THEY MUST RETAIN FOR SECURITY. I ALSO POINTED OUT THE TWO POSITIONS AT THE WESTERN ENDS OF THE GIDA AND MITLA PASSES, WHERE THE ISRAELIS AGREE AN EGYPTIAN COMPANY MIGHT BE POSTED WITH WEAPONS AND FORTIFICATIONS ORGANIC TO ONE COMPANY. I MENTIONED YOUR ESTIMATE THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW AN ADDITIONAL TWO TO TWO AND A HALF KILOMETERS IN THE PASSES AND GO UP TO TWO COMPANIES EACH AT THE PROPOSED EGYPTIAN POSTS IN THE WESTERN END OF THE TWO PASSES, BUT NOTED THAT THIS IS ONLY LIKELY ON THE FINAL SHUTTLE RUN. ABSOLUTELY NOTHING SHOULD

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BE SAID ABOUT ANY SUCH POSSIBILITY, SINCE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE WOULD CAUSE GREAT TURMOIL IN THE ISRAELI CABINET. SADAT, WHO WAS STILL CONFUSED ABOUT THE ISRAELI MAP, ASKED IF ANOTHER TWO OR TWO AND A HALF KILOMETERS WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE THE ISRAELIS OUT OF THE PASSES. MOBAREK AND FAHMY POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUERY, I CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS SO.

5. I THEN SHOWED HIM THE CONTINUOUS EGYPTIAN LAND LINK WITH THE OILFIELDS UNDER EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION IN A UN-SUPERVISED DEMILITARIZED ZONE AS SHOWN ON THE ISRAELI MAP AND ALSO THE EGYPTIAN ROAD IN AN AREA WHERE GOE COULD CONSTRUCT AN EXTENSION TO CONNECT THEIR NORTHERN AREA WITH ABU RODEIS. LOOKING AT THE MAP, SADAT NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI ROADS WOULD BE PRACTICALLY ADJACENT TO EACH OTHER. I AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE VERY FAR APART, AND THEN EXPLAINED THE LATEST ISRAELI IDEA OF THE AREA BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN ROAD AND THE ISRAELI ROAD (APART FROM A 100 METER WIDE STRIP TO THE WEST OF THE LATTER), BEING MADE A UN DEMILITARIZED ZONE, BUT UNDER ISRAELI CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT A MONITORING STATION AT HAMAN FARAUN. IT WAS YOUR JUDGEMENT THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

SETTLE FOR THAT STATION BEING US-MANNED JUST AS THEY WILL PROBABLY DO SO IN THE CASE OF THE PRESENT ISRAELI MONITORING STATION AT JUBAL UMM KHUSHAIB AND A SECOND ONE THAT WILL HAVE TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN THE UN ZONE TO PERMIT EGYPTIAN MONITORING OF ISRAELI MOVEMENTS.

6. THE SIZE OF THE FORCES IN THE TWO LIMITED ARMAMENTS ZONES, I POINTED OUT, WOULD BE THE SAME AS AT PRESENT. AGAIN IT WAS YOUR JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, THAT A THOUSAND ADDITIONAL TROOPS COULD PROBABLY BE GOTTEN IF THIS WERE A SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATION. I MADE NO RPT NO MENTION OF ANY TANKS.

7. THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH FAHMY'S PERTINENT DRAFT LETTER. SADAT ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS KNOW ABOUT HIS

AGREEMENT ON DURATION. I TOLD HIM THAT A THREE-YEAR PERIOD HAD BEEN MENTIONED TO RABIN AS A US IDEA, WHICH WE MIGHT TRY TO SELL TO THE EGYPTIANS WHEN OTHER ASPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT WERE PRESENT. FAHMY OBSERVED THAT, WHATEVER WAS SAID ON THAT SCORE, THE ISRELIS NOW CERTAINLY ASSUME THAT A THREE-YEAR DURATION IS ASSURED. HE BEMOANED THE FACT THAT SADAT HAD GIVEN AWAY THE THREE-YEAR DURATION WITHOUT AS IT NOW APPEARED, HAVING GOTTEN ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT IN RETURN.

8. SADAT STUDIED THE MAP VERY CAREFULLY, BUT WAS CLEARLY DISMAYED BY THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL AND OUR INABILITY TO MOVE THEM. THEIR "ARROGANCE" AND "IMPERTINENCE", AS HE CALLED IT, HAD NOT CHANGED. THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL WAS LITTLE MORE THAN THEIR MARCH PROPOSAL AND
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WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM. AS HE BECAME DEMONSTRABLY MORE INDIGNANT HE SAID THERE IS NOW NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CALL FOR GENEVA AT ONCE. THIS LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL ATTESTS TO THEIR BAD FAITH AND LEAVES HIM WITH NO CHOICE.

9. OUR VIEWS: ALTHOUGH I WANTED TO GIVE HIM A FAIR, UNBIASED OPPORTUNITY TO REACT TO THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL, I ALSO DID NOT WANT HIM TO GET INTO SUCH A STATE THAT I COULD NOT RATIONALLY DISCUSS OUR OWN VIEWS. I THEREFORE INTERVENED AT THAT POINT AND ASKED IF HE WOULD PERMIT ME NOW TO SAY A FEW MORE THINGS. I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO HIM BEFORE ARRIVING AT ANY FINAL JUDGMENT TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW WE VIEW THE SITUATION. HE SAID HE WOULD WELCOME HEARING OUR VIEWS AND CALMED DOWN A BIT.

10. I THEN TOLD HIM WE WISHED TO BE VERY FRANK WITH HIM. LIKE HE, WE ARE BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE. HE SHOULD KNOW THAT EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE WITH RAGIN SHORT OF AN ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. AS THE MAP SHOWED, THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO GO VERY FAR. THE ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IS UNFORTUNATELY, ONE IN WHICH TOO MUCH PRESSURE WOULD LEAD TO A PROTRACTED CONFRONTATION WITH NO PROGRESS OR, IF RABIN BACKS DOWN, TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESIGNATION OF THE ISRAELI CABINET. THE LATTER, SHOULD IT OCCUR, WOULD ONLY DELAY MATTERS FURTHER. WHETHER WE ARE HAPPY ABOUT IT OR NOT, THE ISRAELI DOMESTIC SITUATION IS ONE THAT OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS AND WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING WHAT SHOULD BE

DONE. I RECALLED PRESIDENT SADAT HAD HIMSELF PUBLICLY SPOKEN ABOUT THE WEAKNESS OF THE RABIN GOVERNMENT AND COMMENDED HIS JUDGEMENT. SADAT NODDED AND AGREED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REMAINS WEAK AND THAT THIS IS A PERTINENT FACTOR IN RABIN'S PROPOSAL.

11. I CONTINUED THAT I WANTED TO ASSURE HIM THAT PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU ARE EQUALLY OUTRAGED ABOUT THE ISRAELI

POSITION. AFTER THE SALZBURG MEETINGS, AT WHICH PRESIDENT SADAT SHOULD KNOW HE HAD MADE A GOOD FRIEND OF PRESIDENT FORD, THE LATTER FULLY UNDERSTANDS HIS REQUIREMENT FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES. WE HAD IN FACT CONSIDERED WHETHER TO PRESENT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL OR TO DECLINE TO DO SO IN VIEW OF ITS INADEQUACY ON THIS SCORE. WE HAD ULTIMATELY OPTED TO PRESENT IT
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WITHOUT RECOMMENDATION, SINCE UNWILLINGNESS TO DO SO WOULD MAKE US VULNERABLE TO AN ISRAELI CHARGE THAT WE ARE PRE-JUDGING THEIR OFFER. THIS, I WAS SURE THE PRESIDENT WOULD AGREE, WOULD HARM THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WE ARE TRYING TO PLAY. SADAT INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING.

12. PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU, I EMPHASIZED, REMAIN COMMITTED TO PROVE TO PRESIDENT SADAT THAT WORKING WITH US IS OF BENEFIT TO EGYPT. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF OURS CONTINUES TO BE TO STRENGTHEN PRESIDENT SADAT'S POSITION AT HOME AND ABROAD. PRESIDENT FORD HAS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY INDICATED THAT HE WILL NOT PERMIT STALEMATE OR STAGNATION TO DEVELOP IN THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS AND REMAINS DETERMINED TO MOVE AHEAD. NO PRESIDENT IN RECENT YEARS IS MORE WILLING TO TAKE ON THE ISREALIS THAN PRESIDENT FORD. DOING SO, OF COURSE, WILL BE A MAJOR BATTLE AND MUST THEREFORE BE APPROACHED WITH CARE BY ALL OF US. FOR THIS REASON, I HAD BEEN ASKED TO PRESENT SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES AND TO SOLICIT PRESIDENT SADAT'S VIEWS ON THEM.

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

WE ARE ALREADY THINKING OF SENDING A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THE ISRAELIS ASKING FOR A FORMAL RECONSIDERATION OF THEIR LATEST PROPOSAL. SHOULD THAT RESPONSE BE NEGATIVE, WHICH I THOUGH WE HAD TO RECONGIZE MIGHT WELL BE THE CASE, SEVERAL OPTIONS PRESENTED THEMSELVES.

A) SINCE THE ISRAELI GOVT SEEMS TO BE INVITING A COUNTERPROPOSAL,, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER DOING SO. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR HIM TO DECIDE. SADAT OBSERVED THE ONLY COUNTERPROPOSAL HE COULD SUBMIT IS THAT THE ISRAELIS GET OUT OF THE PASSES AND THIS THEY ADAMANTLY REFUSE TO DO. THERE SEEMDD LITTLE POINT, THEREFORE, TO A COUNTERPROPOSAL INASMUCH AS THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY REJECTED HIS MINIMUM DEMANDS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT THERE IS ALSO A PUBLIC RELATIONS FACTOR IN THIS ISSUE. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME KIND OF AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL, THE ISRAELIS COULD PLANCE THE ONUS OF REJECTION ON HIM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THER WAS A POINT TO THIS, BUT CONTINUED TO WONDER WHAT HE COULD PRESENT AS A COUNTERPROPOSAL. HE HAD ALREADY ASKED FOR THE MINIMUM THAT WAS POLITICALLY VIABLE FOR HIM.

B) I THEN MENTIONED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE COULD CONSIDER PRESENTING A US INTEIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL. THIS, WERE WE TO DO SO, WOULD PROBABLY PUT THEISRAELIS AT THE EGYPTIAN MOUTHOF THE PASSES. IT IS YOUR JUDGEMENT THAT CHANCES ARE ABOUT EVEN THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD TURN IT DOWN, AND IT WOULD THEREFORE TAKE ENORMOUS EFFORT TO
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ATTAIN IT. IN WEIGHING THIS OPTION, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IF WE USE AID AS A PRESSURE DEVICE AND SUCCEED IN GETTING SUCH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, WE WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM USING THAT WEAPON AGAIN FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE COULD HARDLY DO SO TWICE IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WHILE NOT SAYING ANYTHING, SADAT NODDED HIS HEAD IN AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT. IF AFTER CONSIDERING ALL ASPECTS, I CONTINUED, A US INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL IS WHAT SADAT WANTS, WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, WE WOULD NEED AN ASSURANCE FROM HIM THAT HE WILL EXERT ALL OF HIS INFLUENCE TO KEEP THE ARABS QUIET FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS. ARAB PRESSURE BEFORE THAT TIME WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE PRESIDENT FORD AND THE ROLE WE ARE TRYING TO PLAY. SADAT SAID HE FULLY APPRECIATES THIS POINT.

C. STILL ANOTHER OPTION, I POINTED OUT, IS TO GO TO GENEVA WHERE WE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO PUT UP AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME A PROPOSAL FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. THE DATE FOR A RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE COULD BE DECIDED BETWEEN US. WHILE WE HAVE YET NOT MADE UP OUR MINDS, IT IS YOUR JUDGMENT THAT

THE WORSE TIME TO PROPOSE AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IS IN 1976; THE BEST TIME WOULD BE 1977. ONE COULD PERHAPS TALKE ABOUT PRINCIPLES OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT EARLIER, BUT AS HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AT SALZBURG, NO MASSIVE EFFORT TO MOVE FORWARD ON SUCH AN OVERALL AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE FEASIBLE UNTIL 1977. HERE AGAIN WE WOULD NEED PRESIDENT SADAT'S ASSURANCE THAT THE ARABS WILL KEEP QUIET IN THE MEANTIME, LEST WE BE ACCUSED OF HAVING CAUSED AN EXPLOSION AND OUR FUTURE ABILITY TO HELP BE HAMSTRUNG.

D. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY IS TRYING TO ENGINEER A UNILATERAL MOVE BY THE ISRAELIS WHEREBY THEY WOULD GIVE UP THE OILFIELDS INCLUDING THE ACCESS ROUTE INDICATED ON THE ISRAELI MAP IN RETURN FOR NOTHING EXCEPT GOING TO GENEVA AND RENEWING UNEF REGULARLY TO 1977. WE WOULD HAVE TO PROMISE NOT TO PUT FORWARD AN OVERALL AGREEMENT FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS OR SO. I STRESSED THAT THIS IDEA MUST BE ABSOLUTELY CLOSELY HELD. SHOULD IT GET OUT, IT COULD DESTROY THE WHOLE CONCEPT.

13. I REITERATED THAT I WAS PRESENTING THESE OPTIONS IN A SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND OUR DESIRE TO WORK WITH SADAT TO MOVE THE PROBLEM
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FORWARD. WE GENUINELY WANT TO DO SO. APART FROM WELCOMING THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS, IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO US TO HAVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF HOW LONG HE BELIEVES HE CAN HOLD THE SITUATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD ME IN APRIL THAT WE SHOULD NOT SPEND TOO MUCH TIME IN TRYING TO GET AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, BUT SHOULD INSTEAD WORK FOR AN OVERALL ONE. IF THIS WERE DONE, HE COULD, HOLD THE SITUATION FOR A LONGER TIME. WAS THIS STILL HIS JUDGMENT?

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

14. SADAT'S REACTION: SADAT, WHO WAS SOMBER AND VISIBLY DEPRESSED ABOUT THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL, SEEMED SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN HOW TO RESPOND. HE TALKED ABOUT GOING TO GENEVA, BUT SEEMED UNSURE AS TO JUST WHAT GENEVA WOULD DO. FAHMY POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT GENEVA COULD BE A PART OF ANY OF THESE OPTIONS. SADAT THEN MUSED THAT HE CONTIMIED TO FAVOR A US PROPOSAL FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, BUT ASKED WHETHER THIS COULD OT BE DONE IN 1975, PERHAPS AT GENEVA. IF SO, AND IF THE US IS "OBJECTIVE" AT GENEVA AND DOES NOT TOTALLY SUPPORT ISRAEL, THEN HE THOUGHT HE COULD HOLD THE SITUATION FOR TWO MORE YEARS OR SO. IF, HOWEVER, THE US GIVES TOTAL SUPPORT TO ISRAEL, THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. FAHMY INTERVENED IN ARABIC TO ARGUE THAT BETWEEN NOW AND 1977, THE US CAN DO NO MORE THAN PUT FORWARD GENERAL PRINCIPLES BASED ON UN RESOLUTION 242. THIS, HE CONTENDED, WOULD SIMPLY STIR UP THE ARABS, ESPECIALLY THE PALESTINIANS AND THEIR SUPPORTER, AND WOULD ON BALANCE BE BAD. FAHMY THEREFORE ARGUED FOR A US INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL, RECOGNIZING ALL OF THE PROBLEMS INHERENT THEREIN TO WHICH I HAD ALLUDED.

15. SINCE THE PRESIDENT REMAINED UNCERTAIN HOW TO RESPOND. I THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO TRY TO PRESS FOR AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER. I THEREFORE TOLD HIM THAT I KNEW THE PROBLEM WAS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR HIM, AS IT IS FOR US, AND THAT HE MIGHT WANT TO PONDER IT A BIT MORE BEFORE GIVING US HIS CONSIDERED VIEWS. HE WELCOMED MY SUGGESTION AND SAID HE WANTS TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIS ADVISERS. HE WOULD THEN SUMMON ME AND LET ME KNOW HIS REACTIONS. AS I WAS
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LEAVING, HE ASKED ME TO SEND HIS REGARDS TO PRESIDENT FORD AND TO YOU AND HIS THANKS FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S AND YOUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN HIS PROBLEM.

16. COMMENT: THE MORE HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL, THE MORE ROILED THE PRESIDENT BECAME. I WAS ABLE, HOWEVER, TO STEP IN WITH OUR VIEWS SOON ENOUGH TO KEEP HIM FROM BECOMING COMPLETELY EMOTIONAL. I HOPE HE STAYS SO. I BELIEVE THAT OUR SEVERAL OPTIONS WERE GRATIFYING TO HIM, THOUGH THEY ARE OF COURSE WEAKENED BY HIS CONCERN THAT OUR HANDS ARE RATHER EFFECTIVELY TIED. FAHMY MAKES MUCH OF THIS POINT AS I WAS LEAVING, SADAT GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO MOBAREK TO SUMMON GAMASY TO BORG AL-ARAB TOMORROW FOR A STRATEGY

SESSION, (SINCE MY RETURN TO CAIRO, I HAVE HEARD THAT HE HAS CANCELLED HIS SCHEDULED MEETINGS WITH MARQUIS CHILDS AND CARL ROWAN FOR TOMORROW FOR WHAT I AM SURE IS THE SAME REASON). I EXPECT THAT I WILL BE CALLED WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY TO HEAR HIS RESPONSE. IN THE MEANTIME, I HAVE IMPHASIZED TO FAHMY THAT THE PRESIDENT SOULD BE DISSUADED FROM DOING ANYTHING IRREVOCABLE UNTIL WE HAVE HAD AT LEAST ONE FULL EXCHANGE BETWEEN CAIRO AND WASHINGTON AND PERHAPS MORE. FAHMY AGREES. FAHMY MAKES THE POINT THAT SADAT TRUSTS PRESIDENT FORD, YOU AND ME AND DOUBTS THAT SADAT WILL WANT TO DO ANYTHING PRECIPTIOUS WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING WITH US. FAHMY IS STAYING IN AKEXANDRAI SO THAT HE HAS A SHORTER DISTANCE TO DRIVE TO BORG AL-ARAB TOMORROW.

17. IN SADAT'S CURRENT STATE OF MIND AND PREOCCUPATION WITH DECIDING WHAT TO DO, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO PRESS HIM TO RECEIVE CHILDS AND ROWAN TOMORROW AS HE HAD INITALLY SCHEDULED. TO DO SO WOULD SIT BADLY. IF THEY ASK FOR MY INTERCESSION, I WILL INFORM THEM WITHOUT GIVING ANY DETAILS THAT I KNOW THE PRESIDENT HAS UNEXPECTEDLY CALLED A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH HIS ADVISERS TOMORROW AND THAT THEY MUST BE GUIDED BY HIS JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER. IF THEY ARE HERE A FEW DAYS LONGER, I MIGHT BE ABLE TO ARRANGE A RESCHEDULED SESSION. A SADAT INTERVIEW WITH CHILDS AND ROWAN IN THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENT STATE OF MIND WOULD IN ANY CASE HARDLY BE HELPFUL.
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